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TAXATION-FEDERAL INCOME TAX-ACCRUAL OF STATE PROPERTY TAXES

PROTEST-During the years 1946 to 1950 a local tax upon
respondent's real property was assessed at one hundred dollars.1 RespondPAID UNDER

1 The parties, for the purpose of the suit, adopted a simplified example based upon
an assessment of $100. Actually, hundreds of parcels of property were involved, and
the amount of the claim was substantial.
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ent paid the full assessment to avoid interest penalties and seizure and
sale of the property under tax liens, but contested the assessment in the
state court, denying any liability greater than eighty-five dollars. In each
of the preceding years, complying with a private ruling directed to it by
the Commissioner,2 respondent had deducted the full one hundred dollars,
and, when in 1951 the tax was fixed by the state court at ninety-five dollars,
respondent included the five-dollar refund in its gross income. Respondent
then instituted this action to recover an alleged overpayment of income tax
in 1951, claiming that ten dollars of the one hundred-dollar deduction taken
in each year should have been deferred until 1951, and that the fivedollar refund should be excluded from that year's gross income. The
district court disagreed with respondent's contentions and accepted the
view of the Commissioner that the whole amount of the assessed tax accrued, and thus was properly deducted, in the year in which it was paid
and that the five-dollar refund represented income to the taxpayer in 1951.3
The Second Circuit reversed on both counts. 4 On certiorari, held, affirmed.
The remittance of the property tax, under protest, was not a type of payment which would serve to accrue the contested portion of the tax before
respondent's liability had been determined by the state court. United States
v. Consolidated Edison Co., 366 U.S. 380 (1961).
The Court long ago established the rule in United States v. Anderson°
that all events which ultimately fix a taxpayer's liability for an expense must
occur before the item can be accrued for deduction purposes. This "all
events" test uniformly has been held to include taxes. 6 And where a tax
has not been paid and the taxpayer is denying liability for it, most courts
have not allowed accrual until the year in which the contest is finally
settled. 7 This result has been reached in accordance with the policy laid
down by the Court in the Anderson case that a taxpayer should not be
allowed to accrue an expense and at the same time actively deny liability
for it. But where, as in the principal case, payment had been made prior
to the final disposition of a contest involving the determination of liability,
the decisions were in conflict. The fact of payment and, more importantly,
the nature of the payment caused much of this difference in opinion. A
Principal case, 366 U.S. 380, 384 n.2 (1961).
Consolidated Edison Co. v. United States, 4 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5837 (S.D.N.Y.
1959).
4 Consolidated Edison Co. v. United States, 279 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1960).
5 269 U.S. 422 (1926) .
6 "It is settled by many decisions that a taxpayer may not accrue an expense the
amount of which is unsettled or the liability for which is contingent, and this principle
is fully applicable to a ta.x, liability for which the taxpayer denies, and payment whereof
he is contesting." Security Flour Mills Co. v. Commissioner, 321 U.S. 281, 284 (1944).
7 See, e.g., Dixie Pine Prods. Co. v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 516 (1944) ; Security
Flour Mills Co. v. Commissioner, 321 U.S. 281 (1944).
2
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tentative payment may be made in several situations. It may be required
as a suspense account deposit, as a prerequisite to appeal8 or, as in the
principal case, it may be induced by a desire to avoid interest penalties.
These might be called conditional payments. The critical factor in a
conditional payment is that the taxpayer intends, at the time of payment,
later to contest his liability for the expense item. On the other hand, a
truly unconditional payment might be made wherein a taxpayer pays an
item with an honest belief in his liability for the full amount only to find
later that he may have been over-assessed.
In the cases involving conditional payments it had been repeatedly held,
contrary to the view in the principal case, that such a remittance acts to
accrue the expense at the time of payment.9 The Court of Claims in a
leading decision said that accrual may precede payment, but will not
survive it. 10 This rule was followed in an earlier Consolidated Edison decision,11 involving essentially the same facts as those in the present case. The
fact that this earlier decision was directly opposed to the holding on appeal
in the present case surely influenced the Court to grant certiorari in order
to resolve the conflict.
In the principal decision, the Court laid heavy emphasis upon the word
"payment." Read strictly, the holding was simply that a payment made
with a concurrent intention to contest the liability would not be enough to
accrue the expense. But the Court did not decide when accrual would
occur in the case of a truly unconditional payment followed by a later
decision to contest the liability.12 Such a question becomes important when
considered in the light of the significance to the taxpayer of proper timing
of his deductions. In the present case it was advantageous for the taxpayer to take the deduction in the later year because of excess profits tax
rates. However, this was an unusual situation. Normally, because of the
flat tax rate applicable to corporations, deferral of the deduction will not
result in a tax saving and the corporate taxpayer will desire to take the
deduction at the earliest possible time. On the other hand, an individual
8 See, e.g., United States v. Texas Mexican Ry., 263 F.2d 31 (5th Cir. 1959); Rose v.
United States, 256 F.2d 223 (3d Cir. 1958).
9 See, e.g., Guantanamo &: W.R.R., 31 T.C. 842 (1959); Lehigh Valley R.R., 12 T.C.
977 (1949).
10 Chestnut Sec. Co. v. United States, 104 Ct. Cl. 489, 494-95, 62 F. Supp. 574, 576
(1945) • See G.C.M. 25298, 1947-2 CuM. BULL. 39.
11 Consolidated Edison Co. v. United States, 133 Ct. Cl. 376, 135 F. Supp. 881 (1955) ,
cert. denied, 351 U.S. 909 (1956).
12 Such a determination was not necessary to the Court's decision. The Court
incidentally mentioned the problem, saying: "Of course, an unconditional 'payment•·
made by a taxpayer in apparent 'satisfaction' of an asserted matured tax liability is,
without more, plain and persuasive evidence, at least against the taxpayer, that 'all the
events [have] occur[red] which fix the amount of the tax and determine the liability o£
the taxpayer to pay it'••• :• Principal case at 391.
.
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taxpayer, subject to the progressive rate structure, is often able to effect a
substantial tax saving by deferring or accelerating deductions to a year of
higher profits.
Although few cases have reached the courts in which there has been a
truly unconditional payment, at least one case has directly held that an
unconditional payment of a tax does not accrue the expense if the liability
is later contested.13 In that case the court rejected the theory that a payment
amounts to an admission of liability, and thus accrues the expense. The
court felt that there should be no distinction between an unconditional
payment and one which is made with a concurrent intention to contest the
liability; that neither should operate to accrue the expense before determination of the contest. This amounts to a significant extension of the "all
events" test which the court attempted to justify on the ground that the
point in time at which the taxpayer forms an intention to contest the liability is not important. The view that an unconditional payment, followed
by a later decision to contest the liability, does not accrue an expense requires a broad interpretation of the holding in the principal case. Whether
such an extension of the "all events" test is justifiable might well tum on the
significance of two factors: the fundamental policy consideration underlying the "all events" test, and the problem of difficulty of proof with
regard to good faith.
The "all events" test rests upon the premise that a taxpayer should not
be allowed to accrue an expense item and take a deduction for it when at
the same time he is loudly protesting in a court of law that he does not in
fact owe it. But if the test is extended to the point where a decision to
contest the liability, made after an unconditional payment, will re-open
and postpone an earlier accrual, a situation arises which is in discord with
that very premise. Upon making such an unconditional payment the taxpayer would have accrued the expense and taken the deduction for it,
since all the events which fix the liability would ostensibly have occurred.
But, if in a later year the taxpayer decided to contest his liability for the
expense, he would be permitted, and indeed required, to re-open the return
of the earlier year and postpone the deduction, thus canceling the accrual
effect of what had originally been an unconditional admission of liability.
This is the very type of inconsistent conduct which the "all events" test
seeks to prevent.
The question of the taxpayer's good faith presents a second problem.
If the court holds that an unconditional payment with a subsequent
decision to contest requires a re-opening and postponement of the earlier
accrual, a taxpayer might try to postpone a disproportionately large amount
13

Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 51 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1688 (N.D. Ohio 1956).

Cf. Pierce Estates v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 475 (3d Cir. 1952); Cooperstown Corp. v.
Commissioner, 144 F.2d 693 (3d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 772 (1944).
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to the later year. Since deduction of the entire contested amount would
be postponed, a dishonest taxpayer could increase the size of this deduction by merely over-asserting his claim when contesting the liability. But
the question of good faith does not end here. What if the taxpayer were
to make what appears to be an unconditional payment, while in reality he
intends full well to contest the expense? If the element of bad faith could
be proved, the court might well hold that the payment does not accrue
the expense, on the authority of the principal case. But such proof may
be very difficult to obtain. Thus, if the court were to hold that a truly unconditional payment does accrue the expense, a taxpayer with a valid
ground for contesting the liability might nevertheless be able to accelerate
the deduction to an earlier year by making what appears to be an unconditional payment.
Thus, a court is faced with a problem of good faith no matter what
effect is given to an unconditional payment followed by a later decision to
contest the liability. A holding that such a payment does not accrue the
expense may allow the unscrupulous taxpayer to postpone deduction of a
greater amount than he should, while a holding that such a payment does
accrue the expense opens up the possibility of a wrongful acceleration of
the deduction. A clearer ground for resolution of the problem is found
in the basic policy underlying the "all events" test. And an examination
of this policy indicates that an unconditional payment, even though followed by a later decision to contest the liability, should nevertheless accrue
the expense.
Robert L. Harmon

